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Two general classes in creative problem-solving?
An account based on the cognitive processess involved in
the problem structure-representation structure
relationship.
Ana-Maria Oltet¸eanu 1
Abstract. The creative problem-solving performed by natural cog-
nitive systems includes a wide variety of tasks of different degrees
of difficulty. A classification of creative problems in two broad cat-
egories is proposed, based on problem structuredness and the cogni-
tive processes used in regulating the problem structure-representation
structure relationship in creative problem-solving. A cognitive theo-
retical framework is used to exemplify the difference in cognitive
processes participation in these two classes of creative problem-
solving.
1 Introduction
Riddles, remote associate tests [20], creative affordance tasks2, to
insight problem-solving and creative discovery are all considered
creative problem solving tasks. Despite sharing this vague abstract
categorization, these tasks vary widely in difficulty, involving from
a cognitive standpoint a variety of mechanisms and different types
of sensory information. For the cognitive modeler, the task of mod-
eling creative architectures thus becomes extremely complex, with
processes implicating most elements of any cognitive architecture.
Moreover, to respond to Newell’s call for unification [25], creative
cognitive architectures need to be able to solve (or at least prove they
have extensible abilities for the future modeling of) all such types of
problems.
This issue is not yet solved in the field of computational creativity
[17, 27, 6] either. However, creative problem-solving, though more
constrained in its evaluation than the field of general creativity (as
problems have to be solved), could benefit by using a process-based
distinction in its classification, akin to Boden‘s [5] differentiation be-
tween combinatorial and exploratory-transformational creativity.
A more rigorous treatment of the main processes involved in cre-
ative problem-solving and the classification of such problems is nec-
essary, in order to prepare the ground for further computational mod-
eling of creative problem-solving tasks and the implementation of
artificial creative cognitive systems. This classification should be rel-
evant for both natural (humans, some animals [13, 1]) and artificial
cognitive systems.
This paper approaches such a classification from the perspective
of degree of problem structure, the representation structure needed
1 SFB/TR 8 Spatial Cognition, Universita¨t Bremen, Enrique-Schmidt-Str. 5,
28359 Bremen, Germany, email: amoodu@informatik.uni-bremen.de
2 Finding a replacement object to perform a certain task when the main tool
is missing (i.e. put a nail in the wall in the absence of a hammer).
to problem solve and cognitive processes involved in accessing the
information necessary to create such a representation structure.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Initial coarse levels of
creative problem-solving are differentiated in Section 2, by compar-
ing such problems to well-structured problems. The classification is
based on the type of processes used to compensate at the represen-
tation level for the lack of structure in the problem. A set of com-
mon principles for creative problem-solving (no matter the process)
is proposed in Section 3. A three-level theoretical framework for cre-
ative cognitive architectures [26] proposed to address a large variety
of creative problems is presented in more formal detail in Section
4, in order to build the analytical apparatus of process-based distinc-
tions. This is used in Section 5 to illustrate two problem classes based
on (two) distinct processes of creative problem solving. Finally, the
general implications of such a distinction are discussed in Section 6,
followed by conclusions and further work in Section 7.
2 Problem structure and coarse levels of creative
problem-solving
In contrast to the well-structured spectrum of problems encountered
in classical problem solving [23], insight problem-solving and cre-
ative discovery deal with ill-structured problems [24], the solving
of which is posited to be related to implicit processing [31, 4, 11].
Such problems don’t seem to proceed in incremental, step-wise fash-
ion, with problem-solvers unable to predict their level of progress
or closeness to the solution [21]. The elements of the initial prob-
lem state might not be crisply defined - as practical and abstract
problem elements (concepts) from different fields can be brought to
bear in creative problem-solving. With the initial state not necessarily
closed, or the objects and relations set of this state not made salient,
successor functions are not clear nor salient either. Such problems
present initial saliency towards wrong or unsatisfactory kinds of rep-
resentation, with re-representation being the process which trans-
forms an ill-structured problem in a well-structured one with direct
inference to a problem solution.3
However, well-structured problems are rarer and more artificial
than initially thought, with some [30] positing a continuum of de-
grees of problem structuredness.
In the following we differentiate coarsely between a few levels
of creative problem solving. This differentiation is based on a com-
3 In some ways easier than most well-structured problems, as the inferences
seem to proceed directly once the representation has been found.
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parison between the amount of structure in such problems and well-
structured problems:
- Normal well-structured problems can become creative problems
when one of the elements required to apply a certain heuristic to
the problem is not present; thus a new element needs to be found
creatively which can act as an (often imperfect) replacement.
- Insight problems - The structure required for the solution might
be present in the memory of the cognitive system, but is not salient
from the problem proposal; various elements of the problem or
problem representations structures might need to be brougth for-
ward from the memory, or the environement, yielding new possi-
ble succesor functions; once such objects are clear, the succesor
function is found and the goal is achieved with ease.
- Creative discovery problems4 - The structure required for the
solution is not present in the memory of the cognitive system, but
needs to be created - though some of the elements are clear. This
involves more than a representational shift to the less-salient, bet-
ter suited representation structures; it requires the production of
an accomodating problem structure representation.
These levels are however intertwined. A simple example of cre-
ative problem-solving is the case of creative affordance problems.
When needing an object with a particular affordance for a task or
routine, given that the object is missing, the human can find or im-
provise a replacement out of an object which can give the same af-
fordance - e.g. when lacking a cup to store, transport water and drink
from, a human can use a variety of other containers. However, this
type of creative search for an object happens in a variety of insight
problems as well. In the string problem [18], in order to make one of
the strings a pendulum, the participants need to use one of the objects
in the room as a weight. Applying a pendulum concept to solve the
problem is the insight level of creativity here, while finding a way
to make a pendulum out of a string and pliers is simpler, involving a
“lower” level of creativity.
We propose that the lack of (appropriate) structure at various levels
within such problems influences the cognitive processes of the solver,
which need to compensate by finding a way towards a productive
structure. The different ways in which a cognitive systems seeks such
structure compensation constitute process differences which can be
used for a cognitive classification of such problems.
3 Principles of creative and insightful
problem-solving
The following common principles are proposed to be part of the pro-
cesses of both insightful and creative problem-solving. Principles 1-
6 are general, while principles 7 and 8 are specific to the framework
described in Section 4.
1. To start solving any problem requires a stage of problem inter-
pretation. Interpreting a problem means building a problem repre-
sentation. This interpretation step is sometimes ignored in classi-
cal AI problem-solving accounts, or considered a trivial transition
from the represented world to the problem representation itself, as
the problem is structured enough, making the representation of its
structure trivial.
2. The problems representation includes/eludes and emphasizes vari-
ous elements of the given set of objects in the problem and various
relationships between them. These constitute the representation
structure RS that the agent assigns to the problem.
4 This description does not refer to nor include serendipity.
3. The chosenRS is essential, as further inferences that can be made
are determined by it. The RS of ill-structured problems is dis-
putable and changeable. VariousRS’s might lead to various infer-
ences and ways of attempting to solve the problem.
4. Creative problem-solving is a process of searching for or con-
structing a representation which brings about a valid and produc-
tive initial problem state hypothesis.
5. Salient structures (or relationships, structure-affordance pairs) can
detract the solver, by getting him stuck in functional fixedness.
6. The (meta-search or creative) solving ends when a representation
is found or constructed which seems to give the solver the oppor-
tunity to make direct fruitful inferences leading to a solution. Such
representations or hypotheses are tested. Then the process restarts
taking into account the new information generated via testing as
needed.
7. Each RS is composed of various connected elements: concepts,
problem templates known to the solver (all these can be thought
of as structures themselves), their relationships and information
about their features and uses.
8. This search or construction of a productive RS can be performed
using a) the concepts involved, the problem structures they yield,
the features they contain (structural information) and b) the simi-
larity neighborhood of the concepts involved, of their features, of
the problem structures they have been involved in (semantic infor-
mation) together with knowledge about their affordances (func-
tional information). (These have been discussed in [26] and will
be described in more formal detail further.)
4 A three-level framework for creative processing
with representation structure
The need for representation structures is acknowledged in cogni-
tive science and artificial intelligence by the invention and some-
time interchangeable use of a variety of concepts: image schemas,
templates, cognitive maps, frames and schematas [22], scripts [29],
mental models, etc. The importance of structure, structural transfer
and abstraction from initial structure in cognitive processes is further
acknowledged in analogy [10], metaphor [15, 16] and developmental
accounts of concept generation [19].
In the previous section, problem structure (and lack thereof) has
been related to creative problem-solving. Thus, the less structure
there is in the initial problem state, the more the cognitive system
needs to rely on internal abilities to provide a working representation
structure. If searching for or creating such a representation structure
out of information already held in the solver’s knowledge base (KB)
is the main issue in creative problem-solving, then any framework or
cognitive architecture which aims at implementing creative problem-
solving must posit memory (or knowledge representation) structures
and processes which support such search and generative processes.
The following hybrid three-level theoretical framework previously
proposed in [26] aims to do just that. In the following, the three main
components of the framework are presented (subsymbolical spaces
4.1, concepts 4.2 and problem templates 4.4), together with the pro-
cesses they support (hypothesizing by concept similarity 4.3, creative
use of problem template 4.5).
4.1 Subsymbolical spaces/Sensorimotor maps
Subsymbolical feature spaces organized by similarity metrics consti-
tute the bottom level of this framework. Such feature spaces are to be
understood as sensorimotor. This level can contain a feature space
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classifying the colors perceived by the cognitive system, a shape
space which organizes memorized reproduceable shape patterns by
similarity, a space which organizes motion trajectories, be it external
or proprioceptive etc. To maintain generality, a limited set is not ex-
plored or proposed here, as it would be implementation-dependent.
The similarity metrics correspond to the feature space itself and the
type of sensor which is doing the encoding. Higher similarity is as-
sumed to correspond in the encoding to neighborhood closeness, or
other form of faster access (i.e. a stronger connection between the
two features).
However, any concept is to be understood the activation of a partic-
ular point in a collection of feature spaces. This type of anchoring is
meant to allow memory search in the similarity neighborhood spaces
of the various component features of each concept5.
Conceptual discovery and transformation are general problems
of creative cognition. However, any conceptual representation that
wants to be in line with cognitive research needs to deal in one way
or another with the issue of grounding concepts. Various stances on
the grounding of mental representation exist, e.g. functional role se-
mantics, informational semantics, structural isomorphism, grounding
via perception and action [2, 3], etc. This framework acknowledges
the need for grounding. In what follows, concepts are going to be
treated as symbolic entities, anchored in such subsymbolic feature
spaces.
4.2 Concepts
Let C be a set of known concepts, C ∈ KB, where KB is a cogni-
tive system’s knowledge base, with
c1, c2, c3, ..., cm ∈ C
Via perceptual experience, agent α has acquired in its KB sensory,
motor and semantic knowledge maps, which are organized via a sim-
ilarity metric specific to the map. Knowledge about each concept is
an activation of features known to belong to the concept, distributed
over these maps. Thus we define A a set of known affordances (mo-
tor actions), V a set of known visuospatial features, S a set of known
semantic tags,
{a1, a2, a3, ..., an} ∈ A
{v1, v2, v3, ...., vo} ∈ V
{s1, s2, s3, ...., sp} ∈ S
so that:
C ⊂ P (A)× P (V )× P (S)
C = (A′, V ′, S′), A′ ⊂ A
There is no need for a concept to manifest activation along all these
maps, it can very well be that:
∃cx ∈ C, cx = (A′, V ′, S′) = {∅, vi, vj , si}
∃cy ∈ C, cy = (A′, V ′, S′) = {ai, vk, ∅}
Knowledge can be added to all sets C,A, V , thus when a cz /∈ C
is observed, it is added to the set, together with the corresponding
observed affordances in A, visuospatial features in V , semantic tags
5 Such search can be envisaged on more than feature-similar spaces - e.g.
context similarity might play a role in faster access between two items, and
therefore in the organization of such maps. In this framework, search via
context similarity is mediated by higher level representation structures (the
context).
in S, where the insertion point in these maps is based on similarity
metrics specific to such a map.
Activation over new features can be added as part of a concepts in
KB, if known concepts with new features are observed:
Known: c3 = {green, round, to eat, apple}
Observed: c3 = {yellow, round, apple}
Then in KB: c3 = {green, yellow, round, to eat, apple}
New semantic tags (object names) can be added in the same manner:
Known: c3 = {green, red, round, to eat, apple}
Observed: c3 = {green, round, pomme}
New: c3 = {green, red, round, to eat, apple, pomme}
Inferences about objects in the environment can be drawn on their
names or a subset of features, by activating a known concept. Thus
receiving from the environment the subset:
s1 = {round, to eat}
can trigger
c24 = {green, red, round, to eat, apple},
c26 = {orange, round, to eat, orange},
c28 = {yellow, round, to eat, pomelo}
in various orders, depending on the respective concepts’activation
function in the specific KB (this accounts for individual experience
with various objects). 6
The encoding system can allow for the formation of complex and
abstract concepts by enlarging its element set to involve other con-
cepts and a relation set R. Thus:
- the concept with the semantic tag s10 apple is an activation of a
visual color point or subgroup v1 on visual color space, an activa-
tion v2 over a shape map, and an activation a5 of affordances.
- the concept with the semantic tag apple garden is a composed con-
cept which draws on both concepts apple tree and garden, specific
relationships between them (e.g. r9 - apple trees part of the gar-
den) and affordances connected to some such relationships (apples
grow on apple trees, apple trees grow in the garden).
- concepts which represent composed objects (e.g. fishing rod) can
be represented as an activation of the various composing parts
(rod, fishing line, hook, etc. ), their relations (e.g. attached to, elon-
gates) and affordances (e.g. fishing).
- abstract concepts like Justice can be understood as an activation
over a set of concepts like integrity, rights, property, balance,
wellbeing, emotional areas (sets of reactions) to various actions
involving the previous concepts, consequence chains, etc.
Some of these complex or abstract objects lend themselves better
to encoding via RS’s akin to problem templates (see Section 4.4).
Comprehension of the system is a collection of activations of the
concepts in its KB corresponding to the objects present in the scene
6 This could of course be done by propositional means; however, when more
specific features in appropriate feature spaces are used (i.e. encoding of
shape contour, which is hard to describe by propositional means), the item
can be ellicited out of the KB with more accuracy, and comparison can be
performed with feature-specific tools.
Olte?eanu, A.M. (2014) - Two general classes in creative problem-solving?  An account based on the cognitive processess involved in the  
problem structure - representation structure relationship. In Proceedings of the Workshop “Computational Creativity, Concept Invention, and General Intelligence”, 
editors Besold T., K?hnberger K.-U., Schorlemmer M. and Smaill A., Publications of the Institute of Cognitive Science, Osnabr?ck.
that the system is observing. Thus every scene SC is comprehended
as a collection of concepts - SC = {c1, c3, c7} - their known or ob-
served features, relations and affordances, where some affordances,
concepts or objects, and relations might not be known. Unknown
objects can be understood via analogy and/or learned (added to the
knowledge base) in a preferential fashion, when either:
- they are something the agent is focusing on (thus deploying atten-
tion/activation resources to);
- they are connected to a concept the agent already knows (thus the
concept already holds activation power as a unit);
- they are similar to something known;
- they are entirely new;
depending on whether the agent is in an exploratory/inquisitive
mode, in an analytic or creative problem-solving mode (or on the na-
ture of the individual agent). Each strategy comes with its own type
of gains and trade-offs.
A higher degree of attention payed to a certain set of objects adds
a higher degree of activation to the concept in the system’s memory,
however the activation of the previous concepts that the system has
seen might still be present (dropping over time), as to provide noise in
the system, account for cognitive bias effects and generally provide
new overlaps and relations. In this context, short-term memory is
defined as the number of items which can be active at the same time,
considering that some such items may be representation structures
which contain multiple elements (akin to chunks).
Activation of particular concepts can trigger activation of specific
higher-level (multiple-element) representation structures in the KB
of the agent (see 4.4). In the case of problem-solving, such represen-
tation structures may be problem templates which include the objects
in the scene. If such problem templates are activated though they do
not constitute productive representation structures for the problem at
hand, the agent can get stuck in functional fixedness.
4.3 Hypothesizing by concept similarity
Because of the distributed encoding, concept similarity can be com-
puted between concepts by comparing their elements. Thus, be-
cause of their common affordance and visual feature elements, c1 =
{a1, a2, v1, v2, s1} and c2 = {a2, a3, v1, v3, s2} can be considered
similar.
Further, remember that A, V and S are spaces over which the
similarity metric is meaningful and representative of the respective
space, as proposed in [26]. Thus similarity ratings can be obtained
within A, V and S between different elements.
Both these types of similarity ratings can be used for hypothe-
sizing. Due to space concerns, in the following we will show a few
examples of the element-based similarity hypothesizing.
Consider an agent that knows:
c1 = {a1, a2, v1, v2, s1}
c2 = {a2, a3, v1, v3, s2}
Then c1 and c2 overlap in a2 and v1.
c1 ∩ c2 = {a2, v1}
If both c1 and c2 are associative synaptic bindings, the activation
fC(c) traveling across both associative synaptic paths of c1 and c2
will strengthen the connection between their overlapping features:
fC(a2, v1) = fC(c1) + fC(c2)
Now consider a c3, the affordances of which are unknown:
c3 = {v2, v3, s3, a?}
The system will check its similarity with known concepts, select c1
and c2 as most similar, and notice some degree of feature overlap:
c3 ∩ c1 = {v2}
c3 ∩ c2 = {v3}
The system will then propose that some of the affordances which
hold for c1 and c2 might hold for c3. A direct correlate relation be-
tween such visuospatial features and an affordance does not exist:
The query: ?∃ax ∈ A, fC(ax, v2, v3) ≥ 0 returns false.
The system could propose as a general hypothesis that c3 inherits the
affordances of the concepts it overlaps:
c3 = {?a1, ?a2, ?a3, v2, v3, s3}
However, because of the previously observed strong correlation
fC(a2, v1) and v1 /∈ c3, the hypothesis can be refined one step fur-
ther, with only a1 and a3 being proposed as possible affordances to
check for in the real world for c3.
4.4 Problem templates
The need for structured representation has been previously men-
tioned. Such structured representations can be acquired in a variety
of ways. Some concepts or sets of objects can be bound together be-
cause of being encountered in a similar context (e.g. knives, forks
and plates). Other such structured representations are dynamic, bind-
ing concepts to the actions that involve them (e.g. a juggler throwing
balls in the air in a certain motion pattern is such a representation).
In some such structured representation, the element of episodic ar-
rangement (the order of actions) plays an important role (ex. Tower
of Hanoi problems presuppose a certain kind of movements on the
part of the solver, with some motion order strategies leading to suc-
cess).
Such forms of representations bind together concepts, relations,
action (or motion) sequences in higher order templates. Problems
which have been solved can be encoded together with their solution,
in a form which allows the further use of their structure.
Thus each problem template PT is a collection of concepts in C,
relations between concepts in R, heuristics (understood as a produc-
tive set of known moves) in H , and solution state tags in SOL:
PT ⊂ P (C)× P (R)× P (H)× P (SOL)
PT = (C′, R′, H ′, SOL′), C′ ∈ C,R′ ∈ R,H ′ ∈ H,
SOL′ ∈ SOL
Example: PT1 = {c1, c2, c3, r1(c1, c2), h1(c1, c2, c3), sol3}
The solution state tags can be used in the search for an appro-
priate PT when the desired result is known. Heuristics can also be
triggered when a subset of concepts or objects is present in the envi-
ronment or problem presentation, or when a relation or a composing
heuristic within the problem presentation is made salient. Agents can
be assumed to have preferential heuristics due to familiarity, exper-
tise, bias, represented in KB as strong associations. Heuristics can
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be built compositionally as a set of moves between objects partici-
pating in the template:
h1 = h2(h3(c1, c2), h3(c2, c3))
The number of objects participating in a heuristic or some of their
affordances can be constrained by the problem template, however
they are cases where the slots can be understood as placeholders and
are not bound to specific objects.
Cooking a recipe like h15 = Pasta bolognese is a collection of
actions mix, stir, chop, season, simmer over the concept ingredients
C = {c1 minced meat, c2 onion, c3 tomatoes, c4 mushrooms,
c5 pepper, c6 basil, c7 oregano, c8 pasta}.
The collection of actions required is
{h1 stir, h2 chop, h3 season, h4 simmer, h5 fry}, where
each of these is a primitive cooking template. For example
h1 stir = {foods{c1, c2, ....., cn}, pans{c31, c32},
stirrers{wooden spoon}, in(food, pan),
in(wooden spoon, food), stirring motion, stirred}
For a more complex template h15 = Pasta bolognese, the bolog-
nese sauce can act as a composition of previously known actions over
given ingredients:
h14 = (stir(stir(fry(minced meat), chop(onion,
tomatoes)), simmer(5min), season(pepper, basil, oregano),
chop(mushrooms)), simmer(10min)), bolognese sauce
h14 = (h1(h1(h5(c1), h2(c2, c3)), h4(5), h3(c5, c6, c7),
h2(c4)), h4(10min)), sol5
4.5 Creative use of problem template
The previous template for Pasta bolognese can be used and re-used.
Moreover, because of the posited type of knowledge encoding, the
template can pop-up whenever an open search happens in the system
for a general cook heuristic, with some of the conceptual elements
(c1 mincemeat, c3 tomatoes) present in the fridge. The search can
also be run over timing, and cooking pasta in general.
When creative solutions are proposed by the system or forced
by the absence of certain ingredients, similar ingredients will be
sought. Thus mince can be replace with aubergine, onion with leek
or chalotte, red pepper with yellow pepper, chorizo with other types
of salami.
When trying to change or enrich such a recipe it is rea-
sonable to assume that “similarity” for an expert cook pre-
supposes a set of observed, acquired and tested taste rules
- like taste relations of food items that go well together
(corgettes,mushrooms), (red pepper, tomatoes), or food items
that give a specific taste (chorizo, parmezan, herbs, spices).
Other problem templates can be used creatively in a similar fash-
ion, employing different elements which are categorized as simi-
lar, or mixing previously held templates or structurally sound parts
thereof to achieve a composed effect.
5 Mechanisms of creative search and
representation construction
Mechanisms of exploration (of known concepts and problem repre-
sentations structures), as well as mechanisms of construction (pro-
ductive, generative, transformational operations at the level of con-
cepts and problem representation structures) can be at play in creative
problem-solving. Such mechanisms will most often act in jointly,
however for the sake of analysis they will here be first described sep-
arately.
5.1 Mechanisms of creative search and matching
Generally, search for a productive problem representation can be de-
scribed as taking the form of filling in a template: given c1, c2, c4 and
the need to fulfill sol5, what mechanisms can you apply to reach a
representation which affords the solution?
{c1, c2, c4, sol5} = PT?
Various constraints and relations can be part of the problem require-
ments, which need accurate representation and solving.
In creative problem-solving, the subset of objects required to solve
the problem might not be predefined, closed, or restricted to only the
salient objects or concepts.
The search can be characterized in a variety of modes. We base the
following characterisation on the direction in which the search next
proceeds in the knowledge base:
- upwards - Description: Go up one level and see what problem-
solving or general representational structures the concept or the
structure has been involved in); check if any of their affordances
is similar to the problem at hand; if found see if that structure can
be a useful representation structure.
Given: {c1, c2, sol4}
if (∃PTx ⊃ c1) ∨ (∃PTx ⊃ c2)|PTx ∩ sol4 
= ∅
Try: {c1, c2, sol4} = PTx
This maps the current elements to a known problem representa-
tion, using its heuristics and relations to solve the initial problem.
- downwards - Description: a) Go down one level and see what
concepts or properties of concepts don’t work for the representa-
tion, try to replace the objects the features of which get in the way
(eliminatory strategy); or b) Find which properties are essential -
flag those properties for safe-keeping - (i.e. even if a form of con-
cept blending [8] or concept generation proceeds, those properties
should be inherited in the new concept).
Given: {c1, c2, sol4}
Decompose: cx = c1 ∩ sol4
Decompose: cy = c2 ∩ sol4
Reassemble problem template as: {cx, cy, sol4}
- sideways - Description: in memory (KB) or environment, search
for similar concepts (on the various spaces) and see if they have
useful properties.
Given: {c1, c2, sol4}
if ∃cx sim c1| (ax ⊂ cx) ∩ (sol4 ∨ sim sol4) 
= ∅
Try: {c1, c2, cx, sol4} or {cx, c2, sol4}
- a further combination of the ones above (i.e. upwards + sideways -
Description: Go up one level and check in the neighborhood of the
problems that have been known to use these concepts for some-
thing that matches the required affordance here).
After each re-representation, one can check if the new problem rep-
resentation has a solution whithin its inference set. Upward moves
can be done automatically, triggering problem templates, relations
or other structured representations in which the concepts have previ-
ously worked together. This can bring about functional fixedness as
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some salient templates are hard to avoid, and humans are not used
to manipulating larger structures (like problem templates) quite as
well as other smaller structures (like concepts), which are easier to
contain in working memory.
Riddles, Remote Associates Tests [20] and insight problems for
empirical settings all use predominantly search processes in this
paradigm. Take the following riddle:
What can you catch but not throw?
The catch and throw concepts used in conjunction will initially yield
sport templates, of type:
PTs1 = {ball, catch(ball), throw(ball)}
A search of semantic contextual template just over catch, without the
motion affordances, can yield the semantic context template catch a
cold.
With remote associates, the search proceeds in parallel. Take
the test containing the words: Falling Actor Dust. Let’s say c1 =
falling, c2 = Actor, c3 = Dust. To find their remote asso-
ciate, one needs to find a word c4 so that templates PT1 =
{c1, c4}, PT2 = {c2, c4}, PT3 = {c3, c4} exist. When one has
activated PT1 = Falling Star, PT2 = Star Actor, PT3 =
Star Dust, or at least two of them, and the third can be verified,
one has converged upon c4 = Star.
The classical candle insight problem [7] is stated as follows: You
are given a candle, a book of matches and a box of thumbtacks. Fix
the lit candle unto the wall so that the wax doesn’t drip below. Vari-
ous saliencies draw initial attention. The template of a candle burning
effects like {light, wax, fire}. The template of fixing something
unto the wall requires some material which can be glue or nail.
Wax has glue properties, which probably explains why some peo-
ple try to use wax to glue the candle to the wall. The participants
need to focus on a representation of the kind {support, candle}, and
find the support affordances of the box concept, which are not par-
ticularly salient in the box of thumbtacks representation, as more
likely {box, contains(thumbtacks), full} templates are triggered.
5.2 Mechanisms of representation construction
Some of the mechanisms described above can be productive in them-
selves. Thus if the search is bringing two concepts together which
have not been previously connected before, new relations might be
observed (and it is not assumed that all such relations are previously
encoded). It is commonsense that some of these relations will be in-
teresting enough to be consolidated over time in the agent’s memory.
It is not hard to imagine that some transformational processes thus
happen during this search (new templates are created, new relations
are seen between concepts). However we will refer here to mech-
anisms which are highly generative and productive by their nature
(thus not accidental associations) - whether they developed out of
initial search or they stood as mechanisms in their own right is a
cognitive empirical questions, which this analysis cannot solve.
In this framework we will differentiate between two processes of
conceptual composition (cc(i) and cc(ii)), where cc(i) is a productive
form of inheriting features from two concepts in an integrative fash-
ion, while cc(ii) aims to satisfy a higher template, or can create such
a new template which is structurally different (c.f. [8]).
Thus taking the extremes of cc(i) and cc(ii), if given two concepts:
c1 = {a1, a2, v1, v2, s1}
c2 = {a3, a4, v3, v4, s2}
c3 is a concept composed via cc(i), where:
c3 = {a1, a4, v1, v4, s1−2}
while c4 is a concept composed with cc(ii):
c4 = {a1, a2, a3, a4, v1, v2, v3, v4, s3}
Thus, in their extreme form, cc(i) and cc(ii) can be simplified in
this framework to:
1. maintain structure (aligned in both concepts) and import-compose
features
2. maintain features (from both concepts) and import-compose struc-
ture
However, more classical examples of composition are:
Given: c1 = {a1, a2, v1, v2, s1}
Given: c2 = {a2, a3, v2, v3, s2}
Composed: c3 = {a1, a2, a3, v1, v2, v3, s3}
That is because generally some similar features need to exist to pro-
vide a locking point for the composition processes (and to even bring
the two templates together in the first place).
This is different from processes of generalization, or observations
of a relation through synthesis, which later requires naming:
c1 = {a1, a2, v1, v2, s1}
c2 = {a2, a3, v2, v3, s2}
c3 = {a2, v2, v3, s?}
Thus cc(i) and cc(ii) are generative processes of a more complex
nature than varying some features over the similarity neighborhood
of one and the same concept (like choosing vegetarian ingredients
that taste similar for an initially non-vegetarian cooking template).
Combination of problem-solving templates orRS larger than con-
cepts is a step of even higher complexity. Many new relations can be
established between concepts, and (depending on the problem do-
main), many more constraints are at play when searching for a RS
or sub-RS that needs to fit a particular solution, affordance or rela-
tionship criteria.
Depending on the new relations, emergent affordances
can be made available. Thus a problem template PT15 =
hx(h1([C]a, [C]b, [C]c), h2([C]d, [C]e)), where [C]a, [C]b, [C]c
are conceptual placeholders for a 3-slot template, will have to
account for some of the relationships between whatever sets of
concepts are tried on to see if application of h1 is possible, or if new
(damaging) side-effects don’t appear as part of that combination.
Such productive representation construction processes can be de-
fined as combining previously known RS’s in an RS which inherits
properties and/or structure from both elements. In this process, other
generative, associationist and comparative processes come into play,
creating new concepts, hypotheses and relations in the work neces-
sary to come up with a new RS the properties of which can support
solving of the problem.
This comparison shows that productive and generative processes
are closer towards the spectrum of creative discovery and innovation,
while search for a known representation that can fit the problem is
more akin to empirically studied insightful problem-solving.
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6 Discussion - Searching for a representation
versus constructing a representation
This analysis takes into account the degree of structure in a problem,
and focuses on a framework in which the knowledge brought to the
problem by the solver and the objects in the solver’s environment are
used as a generative set for the proposal of new solutions or hypothe-
ses, be it via search for a productive representation or the construc-
tion of such a representation. The task of the solver is to reduce the
vaguesness of insight and discovery problems by proposing repre-
sentation structures (and their connected affordances and heuristics)
which make the problem well-structured and adapted to the solving
tools in the environment. This is done via similarity and affordance-
based search, associations, combinations and transformations of pre-
viously held knowledge items and structures, interaction with exter-
nal knowledge and objects available in the environment, until a rep-
resentation structure is found over which classical problem-solving
direct strategies can be deployed.
At their two extremes, the two mechanisms posited here can be
summarized as follows:
1. Creative search: Given a knowledge base KB, use similarity en-
coding, associationist links and affordance sets (within the various
levels of the framework) to search RSs until one is found which
can fit (some of) the elements in the given problem description
and affords the required solution.
2. Productive representation construction processes: Given a knowl-
edge base KB, use RS variation, blending and composition with
other RSs until you create a RS which affords the required solu-
tion.
Creative discovery problems can be accompanied by insight-
related phenomenological effects, when a productive representation
has been created. However empirical insight problem-solving and
creative discovery are different in both process and productivity. The
difference proposed here between empirical insight problem-solving
and creative discovery is one of process weighting. Insight problem-
solving is mostly dominated by search processes for the right repre-
sentation, which might not be salient in the representation structures
that are initially inferred from the objects contained in the problem.
In the candle problem [7], candles being put on top of supports sim-
ilar in shape to a box might have been seen by the solver. In the
string problem [18], pendulums have been experienced by the solver
(though perhaps not made of a string and a pair of pliers - therefore a
degree of compositional creativity is involved). However, functional
fixedness can get in the way of using such representations, and find-
ing the right representation is the major impediment in such problem-
solving - if the solver knows she has to make a pendulum out of one
of the strings, the creative step of tying an object to the string is not
as hard to come by.
In creative discovery, the accent falls on constructing a represen-
tation which is useful, despite one not existing initially in the knowl-
edge base of the agent (sometimes not even in an analogical form).
More constructive processes and transformations of known represen-
tation structures are necessary. That being said, undoubtedly many
variations exist between the two ends of the creative problem-solving
spectrum.
Boden [5] differentiates between combinatorial and exploratory-
transformational creativity. The proposed framework contains all
three types of processes: combinatorial (at relation and concept lev-
els), exploratory (similarity based search) and transformational (at
the level of RS change). Insight problem-solving and creative dis-
covery have been defined as using all three in different degrees. For
comparison reasons, this could be defined as exploratory and trans-
formational processes dominating insight problem-solving, and com-
binatorial and transformational processes dominating creative dis-
covery. However, the two process-based classifications are not en-
tirely amenable to comparison.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose and illustrate
a specific process-based differentiation in creative problem-solving.
These processes are illustrated with examples of mechanisms in a
partial formalization of a previously proposed theoretical framework.
Various parts of this framework can be considered similar to or
amenable to implementation by already existent AI tools (which was
the author’s intention). Thus the sensory maps could be classified
using self-organized maps [14], the pattern-recognition for shapes
could be done via simple Hopfield networks [12], the conceptual an-
choring in feature maps could be considered similar to conceptual
spaces [9], the representation structures can be considered similar to
frames [22] with fillable slots, while the choice between them related
to case based reasoning [28]. The purpose of the theoretical frame-
work was to put together knowledge representation principles which
will make such a knowledge base (and the interactions with the ob-
jects in the problem-space or environment) easier to navigate and re-
represent. The contribution in this sense is the pairing of knolwedge
representation types and processes (which can be implemented with
known tools) in order to make creative problem-solving principles
more amenable to analysis.
Structural information, semantic information and functional infor-
mation all play a role in this framework. The structural part involves
seeing concepts as an activation of features, and problem templates
as ordered collections of concepts, relations and affordances. The
feature spaces themselves are considered to be structured by being
organized by a metric relevant to the specific feature space. However
this organization turns them into semantic spaces for the concepts
anchored in these features.
Thus concepts are semantically expressed via the features they are
anchored into. Furthermore, a concept can be considered related on
a specific dimension to a concept with which it shares features on
that dimension. Concepts also gain semantics via the context of the
problem templates (or other representation structures and relations)
they are involved in, with various features of a particular concept
being emphasized by becoming productive in a particular context.7
Functional information can be encoded and decoded in such a
framework both explicitly and implicitly. Examples of explicit func-
tional information are the affordances connected to or part of various
concepts, problem templates and other RS’s (i.e. relations, complex
concepts, etc). Implicit functional information is present via the par-
ticipation of various concepts and relations in various problem tem-
plates, thus is encoded within the structure of such representation. In
this sense, a concept affords the solving with a particular template,
and a template affords the use of particular concepts (or others with
similar structure), in a way similar to objects affording particular ac-
tions.
7 Conclusions and further work
This paper has approached creative problem-solving from the per-
spective of the relation between the structure in such problems
(which can be missing, unclear, non-salient, not leading to produc-
tive inferences, etc.) and the demands this makes upon representation
7 Similarly, the semantics of a feature are expressed by its place in a feature
map, and the various concepts/contexts in which it is triggered.
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structure. The paper has proposed a process-based differentiation of
creative problem-solving classes, using the processes involved in ral-
lying the productive representation structure. The two types of pro-
cesses considered for such a differentiation here have been search
versus constructive processes. They have been exemplified in the
context of a previously described framework [26], which has been
(partially) formalized for these purposes. The two classes described
here involve a higher amount of creative search (Riddles, Remote
Associate problems, empirical insight problems) or a higher amount
of representation construction processes (e.g. concept and RS gen-
eration through composition and blending, creative discovery prob-
lems).
The process differentiations posited here needs studying in cog-
nitive empirical settings. This comparison proposes the testable as-
sumption that human solvers good at one type of problems of cre-
ative search for representation (like Riddles) will be good at others
too (like Remote Associates or empirical insight problems), when
one controls for the different types of sensory encoding.
This paper has proposed that certain problems normally used for
the assessment of creativity (such as Riddles, Remote Associate
problems, insight problems used in empirical settings) belong to a
class which requires processes of creative search more than processes
of construction. The different kinds of problems belonging to the cre-
ative construction of a productive representation class need further
dissemination; such different types also need to be related to tests
administered in empirical settings.
The difference in difficulty for human problem-solvers between
the various levels of such problems need to be assessed. Compu-
tational difficulty in this framework can be assessed as the num-
ber of manipulations of structure required, or the distance of search
necessary to reach a productive representation structure. Controlled
computational experimentation could further help the design of such
classes of problems of different levels of difficulty.
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